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Abstract: The paper provides a survey of theoretical and empirical literature on non-linear 
impact of democracy on economic growth. First, it looks at two main approaches to the non-
linearity: the U-shape and the inverse U-shape. Then it proceeds by looking at the specifics of 
hybrid regimes and tries to understand, whether the results could be driven by specific 
features of some semi-democracies and semi-autocracies. Finally, it discusses the opportunity 
to test the growth-and-democracy nexus using subnational data, and considers the first results 
of this approach. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The relation between democracy and economic growth belongs to the most 
controversial fields of political economics. The consensus seems to be that there is an 
inconclusive relationship between democracy and growth, depending upon the specifics of 
channels observed, regions and countries, although the recent meta-regression analysis 
literature challenges this result, replacing it by ''no direct impact'' and ''significant indirect 
impact'' of democracy on economic growth (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008). One of the 
possible interpretations of differences in economic impact of democracy may be that there is a 
significant difference in impact of varieties of non-democracies, democracies and hybrid 
regimes on economic growth, although traditionally economics (unlike political sciences) 
ignores the issue of variations of non-democracies (Haber, 2006). In particular, if one is able 
to provide some ordering for political regimes from a “pure democracy” to a “pure 
autocracy”, the effect of shifts along this ordering on the economic growth may be non-linear. 
Generally speaking, nonlinearities are crucial for the understanding of the growth logic for 
different theories (Henderson et al., 2008); it may as well be true for democracy. 
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This paper surveys some recent literature providing theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence for non-linear effects of democracy on economic growth. First, I assume 
the “ordering” of regimes mentioned above as naturally given and as identical to that 
underlying the popular indices of democracy applied in empirical research. Obviously, “non-
linear” may imply a huge variety of effects: John von Neumann once referred to the term 
''non-linear function'' as equivalent to ''non-elefant animals'' (Page, 2006:90). Therefore I first 
present two conflicting approaches to non-linearity: the U-shape and the inverse U-shape of 
the effect of democracy on growth. Then I proceed by looking at the details of ordering; in 
particular, trying to identify the varieties of hybrid regimes and their impact on economic 
growth. This logic may be more helpful in understanding the reasons of non-linearity, but it 
also provides additional difficulties for empirical research. The last section explores the 
options for the analysis of subnational variation of democracy.  
 
2. “Natural ordering” of political regimes 
 The simplest way to look at potential non-linear effects of democracy on economic 
growth is to assume that there exists a kind of “natural ordering” of political regimes from the 
most democratic to the least democratic, and then look at how  the shifts at this scale affect 
economic growth (in a potentially non-linear way). The approach is attractive, because if 
allows the direct application of the existing indices of democracy. It has, however, a clear 
disadvantage: it assumes that all dimensions of democracy are correlated to each other. Or, 
put it differently, it is impossible to achieve higher freedom of elections without, say, 
guaranteeing the reasonable checks and balances in the political system or freedom of the 
media. It may be true that most developed democracies (as well as most developed 
autocracies) combine all the features mentioned; but for the hybrid regimes different 
combinations of individual dimensions become possible, leading to a multitude of 
“democracies with adjectives”, which are, in turn, often contradictory and unclear (Collier and 
Levitsky, 1997). Taken together with other problems related to the measurement of 
democracy, especially if it implies the construction of a unique scale or index (Inkeles, 1991), 
it makes the interpretation of empirical regularities a very difficult task. It is therefore not 
surprising, that different approaches presented bellow often have quite different dimensions of 
differentiation of political regimes in mind – and therefore present different hypotheses. The 
existing literature mostly considers two types of potential non-linearities of impact of 
democracy on economic growth, though more sophisticated relations resulting from detailed 
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studies of autocracies (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2007) and democracies (Persson and Tabellini, 
2006) are possible, which I will discuss in the following subsections. Both concepts discussed 
can be tested with parametric methods; however, there has been some research on interaction 
of political institutions and growth recently applying non-parametric techniques and 
suggesting the highly non-linear relation (Huynh and Jacho-Chavez, 2008).  
 
2.1. U-shape 
Under this hypothesis, regimes with intermediate level of democracy grow faster than 
pure democracies and pure autocracies.  The descriptive statistics in the favor of this idea 
have been presented by Dick (1974), but the econometric results were provided by Barro 
(1996) for an international cross-section. Barro (1996:14) himself explains the inverted U-
shape by the fact that ''in the worst dictatorship, an increase in political rights might be 
growth-enhancing because of the benefit from limitations on governmental power. But in 
places that have already achieved a moderate amount of democracy, a further increase in 
political rights might impair growth because of the intensified concern with income 
redistribution''. Thus the ''moderate'' democracy appears to be the optimal choice in the trade-
off between governmental rent-seeking and public desire for redistribution and solve the 
“Madison dilemma” (Wu, 2004:24). In a similar way Plumper and Martin (2003) consider the 
impact of political participation on growth. In a semi-democracy as opposed to a pure 
autocracy, government is unable to use rents as an instrument to achieve political support 
anymore due to larger selectorate. Thus the rent-seeking goes down. However, in a 
democracy the government tends to overinvest in the provision of public goods and therefore 
reduces growth rates. Comeau (2003) and Plumper and Martin (2003) also provide empirical 
evidence in favor of the ''inverted U-shaped'' relation between economic growth and 
democracy (and the latter paper also demonstrates a ''U-shaped relation'' between democracy 
and government share of GDP), though this effect was rejected for productivity growth 
(Faust, 2007). Murphy et al. (2005) give some evidence in favor of ''inverted U-shaped'' 
relation between democracy and economic reforms for the post-Soviet countries. This 
argument could be compared to the idea of the ''institutional possibility frontier'' (Djankov et 
al., 2003), which describes a political regime as a trade-off between ''costs of dictatorship'' and 
''cost of anarchy'', where a moderate democracy could also be a preferred solution (depending 
upon the distance of the institutional possibility frontier from the origin). Anyway, the idea is 
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that a hybrid institution may provide a balance between virtues of both extremes in terms of 
generating economic growth.  
The study of Barro (1996) has been heavily criticized for ignoring the problem of 
sensitivity of outcomes to model specification, sample heterogeneity and the treatment of time 
dimension (de Haan, 2007). Similar criticism can, however, be attributed to many (and maybe 
even all) papers discussed here. An additional problem is picked up by Aron (1997), who 
claims that the results may be driven by (formerly) pure autocracy, which have exploited the 
catch-up and enter in a slower phase of economic growth, which (alongside with exposure to 
international community) may trigger demand for democracy. However, Minier (2001) has 
shown that the demand for democracy is increasing in income per capita up to a certain 
threshold, and therefore the fast-growing autocracies may are more likely to pass the 
threshold, than the slow-growing ones.    
 
2.2. Inverted U-shape 
 The idea of this approach is, of course, exactly the opposite: the hybrid regimes are 
unable to gain advantages of pure institutions and just combine their weaknesses. A somehow 
similar approach of ''U-shaped'' reaction of growth on institutional system comes from the 
sociological literature on varieties of capitalism. It claims, that the regimes ''at the corners'' of 
distribution can achieve higher growth rates because of their comparative institutional 
advantages, than mixed regimes with inconsistent institutions (Amable, 2004). This literature, 
however, does not address political systems. In terms of political regimes, there are four main 
factors able to make hybrids less favorable for economic growth than both pure autocracies 
and pure democracies: implementation of reforms, instruments of control, degree of political 
competition and non-linearity of effects of policy instruments. 
Survival of regimes: First, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) relate the potential U-
shaped effect to the desire of the government to implement economic reforms, which differs 
for different regimes. Economic reforms in democracies may appear as a result of electoral 
competition, restricting the ability of the government to ignore economic problems; in 
autocracies reforms are pursued to improve economic situation and therefore increase the 
rents. However, in hybrids the public pressure to implement reforms is lower, and the threat 
of power loss from changes of economic institutions and therefore redistribution of wealth 
and bargaining power is significant, so, the reforms are postponed. Second, however, hybrid 
regimes are shown to be less stable than pure democracies and non-democracies (Gates et al., 
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2006). Then on the one hand, the countries where hybrid regimes happened to be just a 
transitory phenomenon between democracy and non-democracy (regardless of the direction) 
may suffer from the uncertainty causing underinvestments. Even if the expectations of the 
democracy are associated with expectations of better property rights protection (which is by 
the way a completely not self-evident fact), there is still a large class of investors which will 
postpone their activity because of expectations of democratic transition – the “politically 
connected” firms, which are often established exactly by weak autocracies (Thum and Choi, 
forthcoming) and are able to capture a substantial share of economic assets. On the other 
hand, if one is talking about the sequence of hybrid regimes, it is likely that the often shifts of 
political power result into the permanent cycles of redistribution (and maybe even violence 
and destruction of asset – in particular, semi-autocracies are expected to experience more civil 
unrest than pure regimes) with negative conclusions for economic growth. Argentina is 
probably the classical example when permanent political instability and disastrous effects for 
economic performance for almost a century (see also Alesina et al., 1996).  
Instruments of control: The second argument assumes that in a hybrid regime the 
government is rather limited in its ability to use direct coercion (which is at least one of the 
foundations of a pure autocracy), however, is still able to manipulate economic institutions to 
eliminate the threat of development of potential alternative power centers. In this case weak 
economic institutions could become an instrument of ''taking hostages'', i.e. making any 
business activity dependent on the loyalty to the ruling group and reducing economic 
autonomy of potential political actors, thus maintaining control over politics (McMann, 
2006). For example, if the taxation system is intransparent and overwhelming, the only way to 
remain economically competitive is to pursue aggressive tax avoidance. For this purpose a 
company requires support from the public agencies, which can use their power to ''blackmail'' 
businesses in order to extract rents, but, what is especially important, to prevent any support 
of opposition (Darden, 2001; Barsukova, 2006). The experience of government-business 
relations in the shadow of Yukos in Russia is a good example of this ''blackmail'' tactics. ''The 
blood of the regime'' in this case is not repressions, but corruption (Mau et al., 2007:100). 
Acemoglu et al. (2004) show that inefficient regimes based on bribes can be quite persistent. 
However, low-quality economic institutions as substitutes for direct violence have a negative 
effect on economic growth.  
Degree of political competition: While the previous two arguments focused on the 
way hybrid regimes shape economic institutions (and produce worse outcomes than pure 
6 
 
democracies and non-democracies), the final argument is related to the specifics of political 
competition in the hybrid regimes as a factor directly influencing the behavior of economic 
and political agents relevant for economic growth. Kenyon and Naoi (2007) claim that hybrid 
regimes combine polarized political competition with deficit of information, thus increasing 
uncertainty (which has a negative effects on firms’ investments decisions and therefore on 
economic growth). Mohtadi and Roe (2003) argue that in semi-democracies due to limited 
political competition rents may be higher than in both democracy and non-democracy, and 
therefore the growth follows the inverted U curve. Interestingly enough, Hausken et al. (2004) 
produce the opposite result, focusing on a different aspect of the rents – not as an instrument 
of direct utility maximization for the ruler, but as a source of redistribution to maintain power. 
They claim that in an autocracy rents are the main instrument to ensure political survival; 
transition to democracy makes rents more expensive and increases the role of public 
expenditures. Hence, both autocracy and democracy have higher level of public spending than 
hybrid regimes; however, from the point of view of this paper one should not forget that the 
impact of public spending on economic growth is yet another empirical puzzle. 
Non-linearity of effects of policy instruments: Finally, the non-linearity may result not 
from democracy itself, but from the instruments which may be preferred by democratic as 
opposed to non-democratic regimes. Of course, if this assumption is true, it just shifts the real 
problem to the next level of discussion (why the instrument has a non-linear effect on 
growth?), but does not really solve it. However, it may be still reasonable to consider these 
effects, at least to understand the empirical findings. Fidrmuc (2001) provides a very special 
case, considering the growth-and-democracy nexus for transition economies. He shows that 
the democracy has a positive effect on economic liberalization, while the liberalization has a 
curvilinear effect on growth: high and low liberalization levels are better than the intermediate 
ones. This result may however reflect the specifics of transition economies.  
From the empirical point of view, several studies established an “inverted U-shape” 
relation between democracy and parameters of institutions and economic behavior able to 
influence economic growth, although there has been no reported evidence in studies involving 
economic growth directly. Table 1 summarizes the main results. 
Table 1: Inverted U-shape hypothesis 
Paper Dependent 
variable 
Measure of 
democracy 
Estimation Sample 
Leonida et al., 
2007, 2007a 
Economic 
liberalization 
Polity IV GMM-difference 82 countries, 
1980-2003 
Kenyon, Naoi, Political Polity IV Ordered probit, 10,000 firms in 
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2007 uncertainty as 
perceived by 
firms 
OLS transition 
countries of 
Europe and CIS 
and Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and 
Spain 
Hegre et al., 
2001 
Civil wars Polity III Cox hazard 
model 
169 countries, 
1816-1992 
Vreeland, 2003 Civil wars “Continuous” 
measure of 
democracy 
OLS 150 countries 
Montinola, 
Jackman, 2002 
Corruption ICPSR OLS, re-weighted 
least squares 
66 countries, 
1980-1983, 
1988-1992 
Rock, 2007 Corruption Polity IV GLS, two-stage 
GLS 
About 100 
countries, 1996-
2003 
 
The results are obviously not free of criticism. To start with, they work with indirect 
indicators, which may influence economic growth. The relation can, however, be more 
sophisticated, than just a linear one, thus making the predictions problematic. For example, 
the effects of corruption on economic performance are themselves a field of discussion for the 
“grease the wheels” and “sand in the wheels” corruption hypotheses. Moreover, institutions 
may have impact on statistically observed economic growth rather than the real growth 
dynamics including shadow economy (Dreher at al., 2008); this problem, however, is present 
for studies directly regressing economic growth on democracy as well (although, unlike the 
economic institutions, there have been no investigations of this problem yet). Finally, there 
may be a more sophisticated form of non-linearity than just the simple U-shape: Treisman 
(2007) and Sung (2004) report this result for corruption. 
 
3. Nature of hybrid regimes 
Obviously, the assumption of perfect correlation between different dimensions of 
democracy is very problematic. Therefore the results of the “natural ordering” approaches 
reported above may just come from the fact, that regimes identified as “hybrids” by particular 
indices have one predominant feature driving the results, but not necessarily covering all 
variations of what one may call a “semi-democracy”. To give just one example with respect to 
the most established results – the non-linear effect of democracy on civil wars: Vreeland 
(2008) reports that the effect may be an outcome of the composition of Polity index, which 
already includes political violence. So, the estimations do not actually pick up the effect of 
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“semi-democracy” on civil wars: they rather show that the regimes described as “semi-
democratic” by a particular index have higher level of political violence (by construction of 
the index), and political violence is relevant for the outbreak of civil conflicts. Therefore a 
more reasonable approach could be to look at individual dimensions of “semi-democracies”, 
which may trigger the non-linear results. Basically, the hypotheses presented above (like the 
degree of the political competition or probability of regime survival) already look at particular 
features of semi-democracies. This section rather aims to provide an overview of empirical 
results specifically considering these dimensions. 
 
3.1. Bureaucracy and rule of law 
 The first factor potentially influencing the results for semi-democracies is that under 
this category may fall authoritarian political regimes, where government restricts its 
repressive activity (regardless of the reasons) and constructs a well-defined bureaucratic 
apparatus, which operates under at least some well-defined norms (and the decisions are 
therefore not completely voluntarily). To put it differently, economic performance is triggered 
by high quality of public administration. The relations between politicians and bureaucrats 
can be crucial for understanding the predatory or market-enhancing behavior of the 
governments in emerging economies (Dixit, 2006). The main idea of the so-called “economic 
governance” (Ahrens, 2006) literature is exactly that development of good bureaucracy and 
implementation of economic institutions may be more important for development than the 
political transition. On the other hand, semi-democracies may be as well the “democracies 
with weak rule of law”, where existence of political freedom and open competition is 
combined with extremely weak protection of property rights and chaotic regulation. While 
bureaucratic autocracies may outperform pure dictatorships based on violence, democracies 
with weak rule of law may actually perform worse than both democracies and non-
democracies. And, once again, as bureaucratic autocracies often refrain from extreme 
repressions and coercion (and that is why appear to be “hybrids” for observers),  democracies 
with weak rule of law have deficits not only in economic, but also in political institutions – 
and therefore actually fail to meet the requirements for pure democracies, once again falling 
under the category of hybrids (actually, many democracies with weak rule of law, listed, say, 
by Polterovich and Popov (2007) may be re-defined as autocracies, looking at their 
institutional features more closely). 
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 There is some evidence on relatively good performance of bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regimes. Jamali et al. (2007) in a cross-country study for the 1990s show that bureaucratic 
regimes (which codify law and allow for limited participation in political process) and 
democracies significantly outperform pure autocracies, but the growth of democracies and 
autocracies has been similar. Sloan and Tedin (1979) estimate the impact of these three 
regimes on growth for 20 Latin American countries in 1960-1979, and find that bureaucracies 
perform better than both autocracies and democracies (the inverse U-shape). Saurabh (2007) 
also reports better performance for bureaucracies than autocracies and democracies for a 
cross-country sample in 1990s; however, he also estimates individual regressions for three 
continents (Africa, Latin America and Asia) and region-specific variations of impact of 
political regimes on economic growth: “autocracy in Africa, bureaucracy in Latin America 
and democracy in Asia fosters economic growth significantly”. Moreover, he also looks at 
political freedom (including the dummies for “free”, “partly free” and “not free” regimes) and 
does not find any statistically significant difference for them. It once again confirms the 
suspicion that the development of the bureaucratic apparatus and the rule of law is the key 
feature to be considered in the analysis. A somehow similar idea is proposed by Pereira and 
Teles (2008), who apply a dyadic measure of democracy and claim that “political institutions” 
(say, elections system or federalism) can effectively “overcome” the negative impact of 
autocracies on growth (say, acting as a commitment device – an idea investigated by 
Gehlbach and Keefer, 2008). Basically, the paper looks at yet another dimension of “rule of 
law” in autocracies, applying it to political scene. On the other hand, Polterovich and Popov 
(2007) look at the economic performance of democracies with the weak rule of law (once 
again, in an international cross-section) and find that these regimes perform much worse than 
both autocracies with strong rule of law and democracies with strong rule of law. In this case 
rule of law is decisive for the outcomes of economic development. Therefore the rule of law 
and bureaucracy argument provides evidence in favor of both U-shape and inverse U-shape 
hypotheses, as well as some linear relations (with a possible jump between democracies and 
bureaucratic autocracies on the one hand and non-bureaucratic autocracies on the other). 
 Unfortunately, this way of arguing is also not without flaws. The choice of a specific 
level of the rule of law and of the quality of bureaucratic apparatus may as well depend upon 
the political regime. Moreover, identical bureaucracies (in terms of their quantitative 
characteristics) may have different effects on economic growth depending on the political 
institutions. In a theoretical model, Dixit (2008) claims that authoritarian rulers are likely to 
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end up in a less efficient equilibrium attempting to solve the principal-agent problem with the 
bureaucrats, than democratic regimes because the former are less interested in giving up rents. 
Moreover, different regimes are likely to hire different bureaucrats, and bureaucrats appointed 
by autocracies are usually worse than those in democracies. Egorov and Sonin (2006) also 
point out the low quality of bureaucrats in autocracies, but focus on the power struggle rather 
than principal-agent problem.  
 
3.2. Veto players 
Next, the semi-democracies may turn out to be non-democratic political regimes with 
a large number of (vaguely speaking) veto players, originating from both formal system and 
(more importantly) informal power relations in the society. In this case the autocracies with 
high number of veto-players may be similar to democracies in terms of their impact on 
economic growth. On the other hand, it is possible to construct the argumentation for an 
inverse U-shape hypothesis. Hybrid regimes share with democracies the problem of slow 
decision making and reform deadlocks if consensus is impossible. A strong autocrat can 
ignore the constraints present for his weaker counterpart. But, on the other hand, they have a 
lower transparency in relations between veto players, able to create distortions in economic 
development. Obviously, the question is whether it is possible to correctly identify the veto 
structure for a political regime based on informal relations. 
The empirical literature dealing with related problems provides ambiguous results. 
Several studies directly looking at the impact of veto player structure on economic 
performance. For example, Henisz (2000) demonstrates that the number of independent 
branches of government with veto power is positively correlated with economic growth. 
Henisz and Zelner (2001) and Henisz (2002) show that similar results hold for growth of 
telecommunications and electricity infrastructure and infrastructure investments. Henisz and 
Zelner (2006) show, that the veto points reduce the sensitivity of politics to lobbying. 
However, this approach suggests that the “autocratic” systems with multiple veto-players do 
not differ from “democratic” systems; though the democracy is included in regressions, it is 
used as just an alternative institutional indicator. Andrews and Montinola (2004) show, that 
the increasing number of veto players increases the quality of the rule of law in a sample for 
emerging democracies, but they do not control for the level of democratization. 
A more interesting problem is whether the veto player structure is directly interacted 
with political system. Frye and Mansfield (2003) demonstrate that in the post-Socialist world 
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autocracies with higher number of veto players (fragmented regimes, i.e. ''semi-autocracies'') 
are more likely to liberalize foreign trade, while consolidated autocracies are characterized by 
protectionist trade policy. Henisz and Mansfield (2006) argue that smaller number of veto 
players is more likely to increase trade protectionism under bad macroeconomic conditions, 
but the impact of the number of veto players per se is lower in non-democracies (so, even 
large number of veto players may be irrelevant for politics in countries close to non-
democratic pole).  Li (2006) claims that political constraints reduce the threat of expropriation 
of FDI in both democracies and autocracies, but the effect is more pronounced in 
democracies. Hence, there seems to be no evidence in favor of a U-shape relation. 
 
3.3. Tinpots and totalitarians 
 Finally, the difference between semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes may be 
an outcome of different motivation of authoritarian leaders. The approach most reasonable in 
this framework is the distinction between tinpots and totalitarians developed by Wintrobe 
(1990): while totalitarian leaders maximize power, tinpot leaders maximize their rents given 
the power is preserved. Hence, tinpot are per definition more likely to make political 
concessions and introduce certain elements of participation, if it increases the size of rents, 
although the imitation of democracy may also come from the desire to increase the probability 
of survival (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006, 2007, Desai et al., forthcoming). It is possible that 
the shift on the democratization scale just reflects the movement from totalitarians to tinpots. 
However, totalitarian and tinpots may differ in terms of economic effects. Once again, it is 
possible to construct an inverse U-shape relation, assuming that tinpots (due to more active 
rent-seeking) underperform totalitarians and democracies (where rent-seeking is lower). 
Unfortunately, the empirical literature dealing with distinction between tinpots and 
totalitarians is virtually non-existent. Islam and Winter (2004) address the reverse relation 
between the degree of freedom and economic growth for three regimes (tinpots, totalitarians 
and democrats) and do find significant differences in impact of positive or negative growth on 
the political freedom for three regimes. The difference in economic between tinpots and 
totalitarians has not been addressed so far. 
 
4. Subnational variation of democracy 
The analysis of international data, which seems to constitute the largest part of the 
current research, has at least several significant problems: it is often very difficult to ensure 
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compatibility of data and avoid self-selection problems. Moreover, democracy seems to be 
particularly subject to region-specific effects: Krieckhaus (2006) shows that regional political 
context for democracy matters a long for its impact on economic growth, and Mainwaring and 
Perez-Linan (2004) conclude the same for the democracy diffusion influenced by income per 
capita. One possible solution may be to look at the subnational variation of democracy (for a 
general discussion of subnational comparison see Snyder, 2001). In fact, a quite common 
feature of federations in the developing world is that they include regions with different 
degree of democratization. The first source of the variation is the (relative) weakness of the 
federal centre, often unable to control the development of regional political institutions and 
therefore limit the diversity of regional political equilibria (McMann, 2006). The second 
source is the need to compromise with regional elites in the process of democratic transition, 
leading to ''pockets'' of democracy or autocracy. In several cases the very ability to carry out 
the democratic transition may be associated with an ''implicit contract'' with regional elites, 
maintining their autocratic rule. Finally, economic and ethnic differences among regions lead 
to strong differentiation of the bargaining power of individual actors; in a world where actors 
bargain not only within rules, but foremost about rules, it leads to differentiation of political 
institutions. This trend has been observed all over the world.  
For example, most Latin American federations, like Mexico, Brazil or Argentina, as 
well as federations outside the region, like Spain and India, exhibited step-by-step 
democratization with authoritarian enclaves in several regions, which could preserve their 
power for decades (Gibson, 2004, McMann, 2005). In several cases subnational jurisdictions 
established a significantly different economic system like the Communist-led West Bengal in 
India (Chen and Sil, 2007). In fact, one should not necessarily be looking for developing 
countries and weak democracies to find examples of different political systems in one federal 
structure. Quite a few of the U.S. states in the early 20s century were controlled by powerful 
political machines eliminating any free competition at the elections; the dominance of the 
Democratic party in the U.S. South was based on various voting restrictions (like literacy 
test), introduced to undermine the electoral basis of the opposition (see Besley et al., 2007, for 
a survey of anecdotal evidence).   
Another interesting example of subnational variation of political regimes is Russia. 
One could probably claim that the first differences in the structure of political systems in 
Russian regions occurred even before the transition started: in the Soviet Union several 
national republics were able to establish a de-facto higher autonomy in exchange for loyalty 
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to the central government, which, however, did not intervene in the local political process. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union initiated a complex set of bargaining processes between the 
federal government and the regions and of internal conflicts within regions. The first set of 
bargaining processes established the structure of asymmetric federalism, where regions 
achieved different degree of political autonomy, and a relatively weak federal center. 
Therefore individual regions received the opportunity to design their own political system as 
an outcome of internal power struggles. From mid-1990s all regional governors were elected 
by a popular vote (although several regions practiced direct elections even earlier, in spite of 
direct restrictions of the federal center). It increased the autonomy of regional political 
systems, but did not guarantee their democratic nature: regional elections could be easily 
manipulated by the authorities. Both formal and informal rules of elections also became 
subject to the bargaining process. Factors like ethnic and economic legacies of the Soviet 
period, specifics of regional leadership and particular effects of economic transition for 
individual regions seem to have a profound impact on the paths of formation of political 
systems (Hale, 2003). Further factors like political culture, initial economic development and 
proximity to the EU could also have influenced the diversity of political systems in Russia 
(Obydenkova, 2007). 
The outcomes of the struggle differed substantially (Gel’man, 1999). In several 
regions a dominant actor was able to establish a near-monopoly and therefore create a quasi-
authoritarian system similar to those of Central Asian countries or Belarus. The most well-
known examples of these groups are regions where the old Soviet elites maintained their 
dominance behind the new ideological facade. For example, in Tatarstan the leadership of the 
local Communist party was successful in shifting its power first to the Supreme Soviet 
(regional parliament), and then to the office of regional president Mintimer Shaimiev, which 
than created a successful political machine dominating regional and federal elections. In 
Bashkortostan the collapse of the party power caused competition between the Supreme 
Soviet and the regional government, ending up in the formation of a stable autocracy 
following the example of Tatarstan. In other regions, like Mordovia or Mariy El, regional 
elites failed to consolidate their power in spite of attempts to catch up with Tatarstan 
(Matsuzato, 2004). On the other hand, in Kalmykia the newcomer Kirsan Ilyumzhinov 
successfully challenged the existing regional elites, only to establish its own version of 
regional authoritarianism with strict control over political processes and economic assets in 
the region. Other regions provide examples of an elite settlement based on a compromise of 
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main conflicting groups over the crucial aspects of policy (Nizhniy Novgorod), while the 
competition between clans remained an important factor of regional politics (Sharafutdinova, 
2007). Yet another outcome suggests that conflicting regional elites develop institutions to 
avoid the “winners take all” outcomes (Udmurtia). The range of different political systems in 
Russia varied from pluralist democracies (St. Petersburg) to autocracies and even 
“warlordism” (Primorie, see Kirkow, 1995).  The variety of political systems reflected itself 
in the variety of formal institutions (although Russian politics diversity is much higher than 
that of formal structures): from presidential republics to parliamentary systems (Udmurtia, 
Khakassia) and more complex organizations with a governing council comprised of 
representatives of different ethnic groups (Dagestan) (Kozlov and Popov, 1999:185-194). 
Hence, it is possible that further research of intranational variation of democracy could 
provide helpful evidence in order to understand the nature of possible non-linear interaction 
between democracy and growth. 
Therefore the formation of political systems in Russian regions throughout the 1990s 
has been an outcome of competition and conflict between several centers of influence: 
governor, regional legislature, heads of largest municipalities (e.g. capital of the region). 
Towards 1999-2000 these conflicts diminished significantly, and a political equilibrium was 
achieved (Turovskiy, 2003). It does not imply, that the incumbents could always win the 
elections (although there seems to be a trend to lower turnover of governors starting with 
1999, see Nureev and Shulgin, 2006; Titkov, 2007), but rather means, that the structure of 
veto players and of the formal and informal rules, i.e. governing the way (and the possibility) 
of power transition was set. The main factors influencing the political development of Russian 
regions in the 2000s became the activity of the federal center, trying to limit the degree of 
regional autonomy. Several measures of the federal sector (e.g. the introduction of the new 
federal law regulating regional elections in 2002, see Konitzer and Wegren, 2006) could 
indeed influence the political systems in different regions (though the ability of the federal 
center really determine the electoral outcomes remained relatively weak, see Chebankova, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). In fact, throughout this period the federal government focused rather 
on establishing control over the regional elites than on intervening in their internal politics 
(although some notable exceptions, like St. Petersburg, should also be mentioned).  
There are several attempts to study the subnational variation of political regimes as 
factors of economic growth. Libman (2008) applied the Russian data for the Putin period and 
showed that there is a stable inverse U-shape relation between democracy and short-term 
15 
 
growth, even controlling for potential effects of democratic apparatus. The result is observed 
to four dimensions of democracy: freedom of elections, freedom of media and independence 
of municipalities, as well as structure of regional elites. Moreover, bureaucracy has a 
significant negative impact on growth. On the other hand, if the bureaucratic machine is large, 
increase of democracy seems to hamper economic growth. Finally, it also identifies an inverse 
U-shape relation between the size of bureaucracy and the level of democracy, but limits its 
analysis in this respect to simple correlation and not causality. Hiskey (2005) looks at the 
Latin American experience, in particular, at the democratization process in Mexico and the 
recovery from 1995 economic crisis. He also finds an inverse U-shape relation: regions with 
high and low PRI voting rates seem to recover better than intermediate regions. Finally, 
Parnerkar (2004) considers the variation of political institutions among Indian states and 
examines the impact of four regimes identifies on economic performance (although does not 
test explicitly for non-linear effects). Nevertheless, the subnational variation of democracy 
remains an interesting field for further studies. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The aim of this paper was to survey the literature dealing with non-linear effects of 
democracy on economic growth. So far the evidence has been mixed: there is some support 
for both weaker and stronger performance of hybrid regimes as opposed to pure democracies 
and non-democracies. One of the reasons for this fact may be that different dimensions of 
what is usually conceptualized as “democracy” and measured by continuous democracy 
indices should not necessarily correlated to each other. Although both pure democracies and 
pure non-democracies are characterized by certain combinations of features of political 
systems, different hybrid regimes may include different combinations of these elements, thus 
producing different results. For example, hybrid regimes may be both bureaucratic 
autocracies and democracies with weak rule of law; autocracies with larger number of veto 
players; tinpots as opposed to totalitarians. Hence, a reasonable analysis requires exact 
clarification of dimensions of democracy considered. 
 On the other hand, the existing literature has mostly focused on international variation 
of political regimes. An interesting field of studies could be to look at how differences of 
economic systems on the subnational level influence economic growth, since most federations 
in the developing and transition world include political entities with different degree of 
democratization. There are some results obtained for Mexico and Russia, suggesting the 
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existence of U-shape relation. However, even in this case the question of generalization 
appears: democracy effects seem to have strong regional specificity. Moreover, it is necessary 
to understand the relevant dimensions of democratization considered in the analysis, as in 
case of international data. It may also be simpler at the national level than for an international 
comparison, where the country-specific knowledge required for the understanding of features 
of particular hybrid regimes may be absent. 
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